Abstract-Using malicious sites to launch attacks against client user applications is a growing threat in recent years. This led to emergence of new technologies to counter and detect attacks against end user. One of these technologies is honeyclient (aka client honeypot). Honeyclients crawl the Internet to find and identify web servers that exploit clientside vulnerabilities. In this paper, we address honeyclients by studying and analyzing low-interaction and highinteraction honeyclients. We introduce a comparison attributes to evaluate honeyclients by comparing between the two types. Moreover, we present techniques can be used by malicious websites to evade and fingerprint honeyclients, and we make recommendations to overcome these evasion techniques. By analyzing characteristics of honeyclients, we introduce factors to define and measure honeyclients effectiveness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, new trends in the adversary's techniques have risen. Thus, new technologies and tools have appeared to supplement the existing security defends such as intrusion detection systems (IDSs), anti-viruses, and firewall. One of these new technologies, which come to light, is honeypot. Honeypot is "a resource whose value is in being probed, attacked or compromised [13] ." Traditional types of honeypots (aka server honeypots) have to wait for the attacker to make an assault from a remote location. Therefore, server honeypots should have convincing deception technique to entice the adversary into initiate an attack. Using server honeypots ignores the fact that most malicious activities currently target client user side [15] . Attackers consider end users as soft target to attack as they often lack security awareness, and because client applications are more likely to have security breaches and vulnerabilities. As client user has become the weakest link in the network security chain, we need to detect attacks against client side to protect the whole security system, since the security chain is only robust as its weakest link. Therefore, it has been necessary to develop new type of active honeypots, to operate in different manner from passive server honeypots, in order to track and analyze client-side attacks. This new form of active honeypot is called honeyclient or client honeypot. Honeyclient is an active honeypot that mimics, either manually or automatically, the normal series of steps a regular user would make when visiting various websites [15] . The intended goal of honeyclients is to identify malicious websites which target the client application vulnerabilities.
II. RELATED WORK
The concept of honeyclients was firstly articulated by Lance Spitzner (2004). HoneyClient [9] then was implemented as first open source honeyclient, which was developed in 2004 by K. Wang, and subsequently developed at MITRE. Later, HoneyMonkey [16] and SiteAdvisor [10] have been released. However, HoneyMonkey and SiteAdvisor are proprietary systems, and not freely available for further research. A. Ikinci [1] developed Monkey-Spider which is an open-source tool to detect malicious websites. Two significant tools Capture [12] and HoneyC [3] have been developed by New Zealand Honeynet Project. These two tools have participated in the highlighting honeyclients as effective tools to detect malicious websites.
Although several honeyclients have been implemented to fight and research malicious websites, there are no sufficient resources about this topic. Existing works concentrate on specific areas concerning honeyclients. Moreover, there is absence of description of what factors can be used to evaluate and measure honeyclient effectiveness, to decide their success. In this paper, we present and analyze the main approaches used by honeyclients to detect attacks against client-side, and present various challenges face this new technology to help the people who are interested in researching this technology to consider these issues when implementing their honeypots, according to their needs and operation environment. Furthermore, we present practical techniques can be used by malicious websites to fingerprint and disrupt honeyclients. Besides that, we make some recommendations and suggestions to overcome and mitigate honeyclients shortcomings and protect them from evasion. Finally, we introduce some factors to measure the success of any client honeypots implementation.
III. SECURITY ATTACKS
Network systems are vulnerable to various attacks. Security attacks can be classified into: server-side attacks and client-side attacks.
A. Server-Side Attacks
Server-side attacks are launched against servers. The adversary tries to discover the vulnerabilities in services provided by server to compromise it. Therefore, merely running a server exposes potential risk, as an attacker can initiate attacks at any moment if the service is vulnerable indeed. For example, an adversary could send a maliciously crafted HTTP request to a vulnerable web server and attempt to leverage errors or other unexpected behavior [5] .
B. Client-Side Attacks
Client-side attacks refer to attacks launched against client user. In this type of attacks, an attacker makes use of client application vulnerability to take control of client system by malicious server. A typical target is web browser. However, client-side attacks are not limited against the web browser vulnerabilities, they can occur on any client/server pairs, for example e-mail, FTP, instant messaging, multimedia streaming, etc. One example of non-browser application vulnerability exploits is Adobe Reader v8.1.2 which is prone to stack-based bufferoverflow vulnerability [14] .In general, client-side exploits require user-interaction such as enticing the user to click a link, open a document, or somehow to let her visit the malicious website [5] .
IV. MALICIOUS WEBSITES ATTACKS METHODOLOGY
Website which exposes at least one threat or exploit is called malicious website. Typically, malicious websites perform attack against client user in four phases: obfuscation, setting up malicious websites, victim deception, and control over.
A. Obfuscation
Attacker usually tends to hide the exploit vector by using various encoding options to make the code unobvious and hard to interpret. This technique aims for evading static detection tools such as IDSs, anti-virus tools, and firewall filters. Attacker can use obfuscation to make the exploit code of JavaScript or VBscript unreadable during transportation from web server to client web browser. Attacker can use multiple layers to encode the code which make the code harder to decode [7] .
B. Setting up Malicious Websites
The adversary sets up a network of malicious websites. Many malicious websites do not host the attack code directly. Instead, exploit code is imported into the "front-end" page using iframes, or the user is redirected to the attack code. Malicious server is probable to have various exploits. The servers typically check some information on client side, such as web browser type, web browser versions, java version, etc. Attackers attempt to exploit web sites by inserting an iframe or redirecting script. The exploit code contains references to a malware server where a variation of malware is hosted. After the exploit code has been executed by a client application it will automatically download and install the malware [7] .In recent years, new techniques -as fast flux-have been used by botnets to hide malicious sites behind an ever-changing proxy networks consist of victim machines to improve their life span and availability.
C. Victim Deception
Once malicious site is set up, the adversary has to entice the victims to visit the malicious sites using approaches inspired by social engineering area via instant messages (IM), mass emails, social networks, etc.
D. Control over
Once the user visits the malicious sites and the system is exploited, the attacker typically wants to control or misuses the client system as stepping stone for further attacks. A common way to achieve this purpose is driveby download. A drive-by download is an attack where servers can change the state of client system without user consent, which usually means the ability of malicious server to download and install a program to client system without user knowledge [5] . This may include installing malware, proxy, key-logger, Browser Helper Objects (BHOs) or other kinds of adware. Many other attacks victors are possible [13] .
V. HONEYCLIENTS VS. SERVER HONEYPOTS
Traditional honeypots are called server honeypots as they are server-based tools. They are passive honeypots; they do not initiate contact with attacker; thus they should be located in suitable location and use convincing deception techniques to lure attackers. However, with honeyclients the image is different; honeyclients actively search for the malicious websites on the web. This is the main change of the traditional behavior of honeypots. This idea can be achieved by simulating a human behavior to determine whether the server is exploiting the client system. Therefore, honeyclient should be active; sends requests to the server, gets back the server's response, and analyzes the response directly or the affect of response on the system. However, the client depends on the server they are working with; we need to design honeyclients according to server protocol [13] .
There are some aspects distinguish between honeyclient and traditional server honeypot: [5] • Client-side: honeyclient simulates client-side software and does not expose server based services to be attacked.
• Active: honeyclient can not entice attacks to itself, but rather it must actively initiate interaction with remote servers to be attacked.
• Identifying: whereas all accesses to the traditional honeypot are malicious by default, honeyclient must discern which server is malicious and which is benign.
VI. DETECTION METHODOLOGY Fig. 1 shows the process of malicious websites detection by honeyclients. Honeyclient should be provided with seeds to start the search. For example, we can start the search with "interesting" keywords or links extracted from phishing sites and spam mails. The next step is accessing the web to search for servers that exploit the client, to gather information about these websites exploits [1] . Honeyclient sends request to the crawled sites and analyzes their response directly according to certain algorithms, or by checking the system state changes.
A. Crawling Phase
Honeyclients are faced with crawling the web with its millions of servers. [4] . Honeyclient needs firstly to actively search a network to find servers to interact with. This phase is common for all honeyclients; we must firstly presort the parts of Internet we want to inspect. This determines the search scopes of inspected web sites.
Using crawling techniques should satisfy three requirements:
• Obtaining high speed.
•
Avoiding overloading.
• Avoiding sample bias.
Crawling speed is dependent of hardware, network bandwidth, and crawling algorithm.
The second issue is information overloading. Modern web sites are machine-generated sites which use the URL as a transport layer for information. Crawling should avoid crawling of the same content, and should keep the coordination of the crawler threads. Crawling policies are important to improve the performance of the overall crawl, and on the other hand not to overload the crawled hosts. For example, MonkeySpider uses URL normalization techniques to avoid unnecessary overhead, while downloading the same content multiple times [1] .
The third issue is sample bias. There are various schemes can be used to obtain and presort website to inspect. A. Moshchuk T. Bragin, S. Gribble, and H. Levy presented a queuing scheme that depends on the premise that malicious websites contain particular type of contents such as pornography and create queues of web pages by querying search engines with query suspicious keywords or extracting links from suspicious sources, such as SPAM emails, [2] , [4] , [16] . However, this scheme will lead to missing many malicious websites, as attackers could use less suspicious words to build their malicious websites. Moreover, this approach can not cover large scope of internet as many website will not be included in this scheme. The second method is web crawling. In this method, we use the hyperlink structure on retrieved documents to access other web pages. It is the primary means for web search engines to retrieve web pages for their index creation. However, such method has a shortcoming; since popular web pages are likely to be linked with higher rate, a random crawl would lead to bias into the sample. Various researches are concerned with addressing such bias by statistical adjustments based on page popularity [6] , [11] .While bias is reduced, it is not removed as these adjustments seem to leave bias towards pages with high number of links on other pages that point to this page, the so called in-degree. Further, this approach would miss pages for which no hyperlinks exist. The third method is by generating random IP address and checks the presence of web server, crawling the website hosted on the web server and selecting a page from it at random. This approach was presented by M. Pennock, S. Lawrence, and L. C. Giles, to evaluate the coverage of a web search engine's indices [6] . This approach will create the most unbiased random sample from the solutions proposed. Nevertheless, some pages will be missed from the sample. In particular, pages that are not linked to from a starting page or on web servers on which no starting page exist. Pages extracted from link in SPAM message, IM messaging will also be missed by this approach. However, external spam message dataset archive can be used along with this approach.
B. Identification Phase
After sending request to the crawled sites, honeyclient analyzes the response to identify whether the servers are malicious or benign. Two approaches are used by honeyclients to identify malicious website:
• Pattern-matching: it is used by low-interaction honeyclient.
• State Change Check (Integrity Check): it is used by high-interaction honeyclient.
Low-interaction honeyclients do not use fully functional operating system or web browser, instead they use simulated client. Low-interaction honeyclients are often emulated web browsers, or web crawlers, which do have no or only limited abilities for attackers to interact with. Low-interaction honeyclients send HTTP requests to the web server, and detect malicious servers by applying signature-based or heuristic methods on the server response for a fast analysis. They can directly detect the security violation by pattern matching methods, which means applying static signature or heuristics based method on web server's response. HoneyC [3] , MonkeySpider [1] and PhoneyC [8] are examples of lowinteraction honeyclients which use pattern-matching.
High-interaction honeyclients give an attacker the capability to interact with real system rather than simulation. They detect the security violations via state changes check; which means the need to monitor filesystem, registry entries, processes, network connection and physical resources such as memory and CPU, etc. State change checks should give first insight into whether a system has been compromised. There are various honeyclients developed based on this approach such as Capture-HPC [12] , HoneyClient [9] and HoneyMonkey [16] . Fig. 2 shows an overview of high-interaction honeypots. Via configuration front-end, the user can adjust various parameters, as keywords to search for web pages with search engines, depth and breadth of crawling, or number of URLs after which the client honeypots stop its execution [13] .Browser simulator module simulates web browser application, URL analyzer should handle dialog box and other techniques could be used to evade honeypot. Integrity check module checks the state changes of the client system to detect any changes of the system. All log files are stored in remote database to enable centralized logging. Client honeypots operating in different networks can report their findings to central sites that can also correlate the data. The analysis front-end enables all data analysis, to help the operator to keep track of collected information. In this section we will compare between high and low-interaction honeyclients to analyze honeyclient methodology. We studied various honeyclient tools. However, we will focus on two open source tools: HoneyC and Capture-HPC. We will also use commercial tool SiteAdvisor to compare some results. HoneyC [3] is an implementation of the low-interaction client honeypot concept. Capture-HPC [12] is a high-interaction honeyclient based on client/server architecture. The central server can coordinate and control numerous clients across a network; the clients can be virtual machines. SiteAdvisor [10] is proprietary honeyclient systems with an approach to build such research databases. Only limited access to its database results is publicly provided.
The objects of comparison are the followings:
• Detection algorithms.
• Detection accuracy.
• Performance measurement.
• Containment policy.
• Availability and usability.
• Malicious websites rate.
A. Detection Algorithms
Low-interaction honeyclients simulates only the essential features of the target clients to interact with web servers. The subsequent analysis of the server response is based on pattern matching. For example, in HoneyC, Malicious servers can be detected by and applying Snort signature matching for fast static analysis of web server's responses [4] .
High-interaction honeyclients use integrity check after receiving the web server response. Capture performs a state change monitoring by observing filesystem activities, registry entries, and processes. Such monitoring should give a first insight into detecting whether a system has been exploited [13] . However, since some events occur during normal operation can change system state (e.g., writing certain files to the web browser cache), Capture has exclusion lists make it possible to ignore certain type of events.
The approach of commercial SiteAdvisor is completely different. The idea is to download large parts of the internet and then check whether are malicious. They have created a system which analyzes malicious content on web sites, drive-by-downloads, email traffic after automatic registration on their sites, and Internet users who can rate and comments maliciousness of a web site [5] , [13] 
B. Detection Accuracy
The detection accuracy can be expressed by false negative and false positive rate. False negatives are expected to be found in both high-interaction and lowinteraction. Exploit which occur after a certain delay or after user interaction are possible source for false negatives in high-interaction. Once web server response is preceded, high-interaction makes integrity check, finds no state changes, remarks the malicious site as safe one, and moves to the next webpage. On the other hand, lowinteraction examines the server response payload directly, thus it is not prone to triggering attacks such as time bombs and user interaction exploits. When we tested both HoneyC and Capture against obfuscation JavaScript attacks, HoneyC was not able to detect obfuscated attack which was identified by Capture.
C. Performance Measurement
IDS performance evaluation can be expressed in two terms:
• Measure IDS behavior under high load, as attackers can use such circumstances to overwhelm the IDS with data in to hide their attacks.
• IDS scalability.
Honeyclients are different from IDSs with respect to performance measurement. Honeyclients do not process Figure 2 . Framework of High-Intraction Honeyclient monitored data and events; they perform a request, and consume the response, and then analyze the response according to certain algorithms. Therefore, unlike IDSs, honeyclients are not prone to being overwhelmed by the responses they receive. Therefore, performance of honeyclients can be expressed in the speed of honeyclients; number of sites they can connect in a time period, and the time needed to check web site. The performance of honeyclient should be also expressed in the time need to analyze a websites or URL.
We executed HoneyC to query Yahoo Search API for 10 distinct keywords. HoneyC had visited about 7000 web resources (html pages, JavaScript, images, etc). The average time needed to visit and analyze one web site was 5 seconds. On the other side the time needed by Capture was more than 3 minutes when we use the same query keywords.
D. Containment Policy
As low-interaction uses simulated client, containment of attacks is not a major concern. However, as most of malicious contents target Internet Explorer and windows application, it is recommended to install low-interaction experiments on UNIX-like machine.
Security containment should be considered carefully when we use high-interaction as we deal with real system. However, in general high-interaction itself uses security mechanism. For example, Capture itself uses partial security mechanism; once a malicious website has been identified, Capture resets the virtual machine of the specific client to a clean state. However, it is recommended to use Honeywall to protect the virtual machines from misuse by malicious websites to launch further attacks. Besides that, reverting into clean state may be not enough as we should know the time to revert must be faster than malware propagation.
E. Malicious Websites Rate
We used HoneyC and Capture as examples of both low-interaction and high-interaction to inspect 20,000 URLs. We also used SiteAdvisor as a commercial tool besides. HoneyC gives the lowest rate; we found that the percentage of malicious URLs within various categories ranged from 0.2% in adult category to 3.9% for URLs in the warez category. Capture detected the rate to be ranged from 0.3% in adult to 4.3% in warez category. 
VIII. EVADING HONEYCLIENTS
In this section we present various techniques can be used to detect and evade honeyclient.
A. Crawlers Behavior Detection
Malicious servers can fingerprint honeyclients from their automated crawler's manners. Firstly, as they normally send requests to resources which are invisible to human user; malicious web sites are able to detect crawlers, and then cease from triggering or behave differently. This problem is hard to solve, thus the crawler should be refined to behave in a manner identical to a browser as possible. Secondly, honeyclients would send many http requests to crawl websites. Anti-crawlers can be used to limit the amount of http request per IP. To mitigate this problem, we can use intelligent crawling instead of crawling the whole web site, by looking for suspicious files as scripts and images. This can be decided by the goal of honeyclient.
B. Dialog Boxes and CAPTCHA
The ultimate goal of honeyclients is to have the same behavior as human. However, both low and highinteraction honeyclients do not have full features to achieve this purpose completely. Thus attacker can introduce dialog boxes to keep undetected by honeyclient. When dialog pups up, a user typically has two options: OK or cancel. The website might react differently depending on the user selection. A malicious web site could make the problem harder, it could introduce dialog boxes need the user to fill out; the user then has to click the OK button to prove she is human, and the web site drops a cookie to suppress the dialog box for future visits. In this case, user input is necessary to determine the server's response [16] . Malicious website even can use CAPTCHA, which is a type of challenge-response test, to counter honeyclient. Using such response tests allow the malicious website to hide its malicious activity from honeyclient. In the mean time, end user will be deceived into believing that such website is trying to protect itself against abuse, in particular, there are many websites currently use this technique when the client user want to download files or send emails.
C. Emulated Browser Detection
Virtual honeyclient will always fail to simulate all aspects of a real browser. Dynamic content can be used to inspect arbitrary features of the browser using calls that may not be documented. As such, suspicious sites may be able to detect virtual honeyclients by calling methods that are not implemented. This parallels attacks to detect virtual execution environments used in malware sandboxing and is a fundamental flaw of any kind of emulation [8] .
D. Delayed Exploits
Delayed exploit can be used to evade high-interaction honeyclients. The delay will occur between initial infection and complete compromise. Low-interaction honeypots will not be evaded by this delay, as they apply directly pattern-matching algorithm on the server's response.
The delay exploit can come in various scenarios:
• Downloading more malware. A possible scenario is: a web page first successfully exploits vulnerability in client application; then download a process to install more malware on the system. In such case the download process consumes some time. In the mean time, honeyclient has already accepted another web page.
• Logic Bombs. Another scenario is using logics bombs to delay the compromise. Logic bombs are exploits contained on a malicious web page in which the exploit triggers only after a given period of time.
• User-Triggered Exploits. The third scenario is the exploit needs a user action to trigger, such as mouse clicking, opening particular application, etc.
To correctly flag the correct page which causes the compromise, we have to carefully check which page actually triggered and started the compromise. Thus, we need to keep list of recent web pages the honeypots accesses. This needs to store backlog of several minutes, and need to verify them separately. For example, HoneyMonkey only wait for a few minutes for each URL. Thus high-interaction honeypots may not detect this type of attacks. A possible solution is to run honeyclients with random wait times and highlight those exploit pages that exhibit inconsistent behaviors by performing more indepth manual analysis.
E. Virtual Machines Detection
In high-interaction, using VMware is good choice to facilitate the reset of honeyclient after the system has been compromised. However, presence of virtual machines can be easily detected by attacker using various methods [2] . A simple way to detect VMware environments is to look for patterns in the system; for example the MAC addresses, hardware controllers, BIOS, etc. A detection code can be embedded to the exploit page to detect the virtual environment; the malicious site can stop triggering the exploit, behave differently, block honeypot IP or do something else to keep hidden from detection. Thus, honeypot should take measurements to protect virtual machine from fingerprinting and detection. Furthermore, physical machine can be used to deploy honeyclients. However, such solution is costly, particularly if we want to build scalable honeyclients [16] .
F. Using Passwords Protected Sites and Forums
Using passwords protected sites, such as forums, can have the same affect as dialog boxes in evading honeypot. Honeyclient are not to detect such pages. However, using such method will let the malicious sites lose their victims base.
G. Geo-location Attacks
Some attacks nowadays target users at specific geographical places. Attackers can find out the location of visitors, and then they attack visitors in certain country or location [5] . Thus the malicious websites will hide from crawler if honeypot is bound to an IP address out of this specific geographical location. This issue can be handled by two approaches: by an implementation allows running honeypot across many different networks; or by using TOR service to run honeyclients behind various proxies.
IX. EFFECTIVENESS OF CLIENTHONEYPOTS
As honeyclient can be classified as computer-human interaction tool, we can define the effectiveness of honeyclients as the accuracy and completeness of honeyclients tasks. Three factors can measure the effectiveness of honeyclients: speed, detection accuracy, and invisibility. Fig. 3 shows the main factor and subfactors to measure the honeypot effectiveness.
A. Speed
Speed of honeyclients can be expressed by number of sites can be connected and inspected in a time period. Speed is a significant expression to describe ability of the honeyclient to identify malicious servers quickly and safeguard client user against them. The aim of honeyclients is to inspect the internet for malware. Thus, honeyclient should have high speed to achieve this purpose. The speed of honeyclients depends on various factors. Firstly; it depends on variety resources as hardware, network connection, etc. Secondly, it depends on the honeyclient implementation itself; the more complex implementation, the slower honeypots are. Detection algorithm played main role in speed of detection. For example, pattern-matching is fast. On the other hand, monitoring the entire state of the honeyclient to reveal a successful compromise is time and resource consuming. However, external factors can also affect the detection speed as URL size, and web server connection.
B. Detection Accuracy
Honeyclient should have high accuracy rate. Detection accuracy can be measured by false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) rate. With high-interaction honeyclients, FP rate can be neglected; thus FN rate drives the accuracy of detecting malicious web pages. With low-interaction honeyclients both FP and FN are expected to exist. The ability of honeyclients to detect malicious content in website is influenced by both honeypot and operating environment characteristics as: detection method, delayed exploits, and evasion techniques.
C. Invisibility
"Invisibility" of honeyclients refers to keeping honeyclient undetected by malicious website. Keeping honeyclient undetected by adversary allows the honeypots to collect more data and then identify more attacks. As we discussed before, honeyclient can be detected by using virtual machine detection techniques or by using anti-crawlers techniques. Many malicious websites appear everyday, this requires us to find more intelligent approaches to detect the malicious servers. Up to date, it is found two main methods to detect malicious websites using honeyclient in real time: pattern matching and integrity check.
Pattern matching mechanisms are usually based on signatures, such as Snort IDS signatures (HoneyC) or antivirus signatures (Spybye, Monkey-Spider). This method is ineffective at detecting 0-day and obfuscated threats, as utilizing signatures requires identifying the threat in advance. Using static signatures leads to depending on competitive technologies such as IDS and antivirus, which have inherent weaknesses. On the other hand, high-interaction -which uses "integrity check" algorithms to identify malicious websites -has the ability to detect 0-day exploits. However, using this algorithm will lead to narrowing our vision to particular type of malicious web servers; that ones which can change the integrity state of client without user consciousness, which usually means that the server has the ability to install and control malware. However, many malicious websites can not be detected by both types of detection algorithms. An example is phishing websites, which imitate legitimate or transparent proxy to steal sensitive information from the client user. Hence, assistant mechanisms, as URL blacklists, are also can be used to supplement the previous mechanisms shortcoming to detect malicious URLs, but this mechanism requires that these URLs be identified beforehand to keep the list up-to-date. User feedback also can enrich and support these lists.
From our works with honeyclient, we found there is a lack of sophisticated detection models in honeyclient technologies. Thus, there is need to combine between both low and high-interaction. Combining low-interaction honeypot with the high-interaction honeypot can utilize the strengths of both technologies. A scalable costconscious architecture can be achieved at constant levels of false negatives. Low interaction components can be used to search quickly for potential malicious sites, tag them as suspicious and only then hand them over to the high interaction component for detailed analysis. To check if the low-interaction component is missing some attacks, a small percentage of URLs can be passed over to the high-interaction component and the results from both components compared. [4] , [7] .Theoretically, high-interaction components can be used to extract signatures of threats, which can then be used in low-interaction components. However, this is not a trivial issue; extracting a good signature is only part of the issue; the reason is that a crawler will unlikely successfully follow the exploit detection phase to be able to download the malware.
Current honeyclients are not able to dynamically modify the detection rules to fit the current situation. Therefore, machine learning classification should be used to supplement some weakness of current approaches, in order to properly distinguish between benign and malicious websites. Developing efficient protection mechanisms against malicious websites attacks requires also effective analysis tools which allow studying current attacks, and foreseen future attacks. For instance, to analyze malicious script that is encrypted with its origin URL, the analysis tool needs to keep track of the URLs where the content was fetched from to allow later off-line analysis. Moreover, many malicious sites attack a client side only once in a given time-frame, then all subsequent requests are redirected to harmless sites such as search engines. This aims to hold down the analysis and keep hidden from further tracking. Therefore, an analysis tools should have the ability to record and reply all requests and responses involved in a detected attack.
Implementing full-protected honeyclient is not easy mission, in particular with the continuous improvement of attacker tactics. The perfect form of honeyclient should have complete behavior as human to avoid detection or evasion. This collides with the purpose of this technology to detect malicious websites as quick as possible; honeyclient is required to send very fast HTTP request to analyze the internet, and this can be detected easily by anti-crawlers. Thus, implementation of honeyclient should depend on the goals of honeypots and circumstances of operating. Choosing honeypots specification are required to meet these goals as they expose the full functional spectrum of a computer system for the attacker to interact with and therefore allow for collection of the desired data [4] .
Manner of malicious websites distributed is an issue should be addressed. If we compare between the results in Table I , we find that there are gaps between the three results. The gap between SiteAdvisor and the open source honeyclients can be explained from various aspects. Firstly, SiteAdvisor has additional standards to identify websites as malicious such as spam mail analysis, phishing site reports. Secondly, users of SiteAdvisor system can report additional pages to be analyzed. Thirdly, SiteAdvisor actually judge the domain name server (DNS) rather than the URL contents; thus if SiteAdvisor indicates a DNS as malicious websites, it indicates all associated URL to this DNS as malicious too. Furthermore, any website links to that DNS will also be indicated as malicious site. This leads to this high rate of SiteAdvisor. The second gap between HoneyC and Capture can be clarified by considering the detection algorithm of the both. HoneyC which uses signaturebased algorithm to detect attacks is likely to miss some attacks which be identified correctly by Capture on account of using integrity checks to detect system violation. These results show anyone surfs the Internet is prone to risk regardless of the contents of the websites she browses. Open source honeyclients have an advantage over commercial tool SiteAdvisor, because they check the sites in real-time. This speciality is not available in SiteAdvisor. We found that some sites indicated as "untested". Moreover, combining between open sources honeyclients can give good opportunity to provide indepth analysis on attacking processes.
XI. CONCLUSION
Client honeypot is a new technology aims to overcome weakness of traditional honeypots and other security tools in coping with client side attacks. Honeyclients use two approaches to detect client-side attacks: pattern matching and integrity check. The comparison showed that the relation between lowinteraction and high-interaction honeyclients technologies should be complementary rather than competitive. However, some implementations intend to combine between these approaches to obtain honeyclients with high speed and high accuracy rate. Nevertheless, up to date, none of these deployments is available for public.
Although honeyclients have obtained a lot of focus in recent three years. Current honeyclients are still in the developing phase. Sophisticated detection models have not been developed. They have various shortcomings relating to their inability to detect various attacks, and easiness of evading them by malicious websites.
All honeyclient are prone to evasion and detection by malicious websites. Therefore, it is recommended to take some measurements to immunize honeyclients against evading and fingerprinting techniques.
In this paper, we introduced factors to measure the effectiveness of honeyclients: speed, data accuracy, and invisibility. These factors can be important parameters to evaluate success of implementation of honeyclient.
